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I would like to thank the editors of the Villanova Sports & En-
tertainment Law Journal for inviting me to participate with this distin-
guished panel of academic and industry experts. The topic of the
symposium, "Napster: Innocent Innovation or Egregious Infringe-
ment?," is timely and the underlying issue, the use of copyright law
to regulate technology, will remain relevant for the foreseeable fu-
ture. In the long run, however, to paraphrase the immortal words
of Abraham Lincoln, the world will little note, nor long remember
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.' and the controversy surround-
ing this case. 2 Instead, this case resulted in merely the striking
down of one variant of a peer-to-peer file sharing technology and
future lawyers and legal commentators will consider the decision an
anomaly. Conversely, had the courts held in favor of Napster, it
would have been a watershed moment in copyright jurisprudence,
on par with Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 3 As in
Sony, Napster could have marked the birth of a new industry.
* Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Toledo. Professor Gib-
bons would also like to thank Ann Bartow, Thomas G. Field, Jr., Theresa McMa-
hon, William Richman, Lars Smith, Daniel Steinbock, John Kheit, Joseph Slater
and Chopin Yen for their comments. Professor Gibbons would like to thank the
College of Law for a faculty research grant.
1. 14 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("Napster I"), affd in part, rev'd in part,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Napster II") (concerning boundary between shar-
ing and theft, personal use and unauthorized worldwide distribution of copy-
righted music and sound recordings). A & M Records and seventeen other record
companies filed a complaint for contributory and vicarious copyright infringe-
ment, violations of section 980(a) (2) of the California Civil Code, and unfair com-
petition against Napster, Inc., an Internet start-up that enables users to download
MP3 music files without payment. See id.
2. See Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, Delivered at Gettysburg on Novem-
ber 19, 1863, available at http://www.loc.gov./exhibits/gadd/gadrft.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 18, 2001).
3. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (ruling on legality of Video Cassette Recorders). In
Sony, Universal Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions brought a copyright in-
fringement suit against Sony and several of its retailers for manufacturing and sell-
ing Betamax video tape recorders (VTR). See id. Universal and Disney claimed
that because the Betamax VTR was capable of recording off the air television
broadcasts, Sony was liable as a contributory infringer. See id. The United States
Supreme Court adopted the "staple article of commerce" doctrine from patent law
and held in favor of Sony. Id. at 417-18.
(57)
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Each new technology displaces or causes changes in dominant
economic and legal models governing its predecessor. 4 New tech-
nology, unless co-opted by existing economic interests, always re-
sults in a call for regulation or prohibition.5 This strident call is
often based on Chicken Little's claim that, "the sky is falling," and
further fortified with predictions of dire economic effects. 6 "Exam-
ples of such historically threatening technology include piano rolls,
phonographs, motion pictures, cable television, photocopiers, vide-
ocassette recorders ("VCRs") and Digital Audio Tapes ("DATs") ."7
Amazingly, when courts ignore these predictions, the sky never
falls. Instead, some businesses quickly adapt to the new technology,
develop new business models and become even more prosperous.8
[I]t is interesting to note that the Supreme Court found
against copyright owners in Sony despite claims that doing
so would seriously undermine the movie industry. For ex-
ample, Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America, has been quoted as saying that the
4. See Damien A. Reihl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella,
and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1761,
1762 (2001). See generally Sarah H. McWane, Comment, Hollywood v. Silicon Val-
ley: DeCSS Down, Napster To Go?, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 87 (2001).
5. See Reihl, supra note 4 at 1762.
6. See James M. Burger, "Rock 'n Roll Is Here to Stay:" Napster and Online Music
Distribution, 19 COMM. LAW. 1, 32 (2001) (noting new technologies open up new
markets and applications for existing works and such technologies may lead to use
of such works in ways that were not contemplated, let alone legally authorized, by
works' owners). "[B]oth the law and the marketplace historically have adapted to
new technologies while still allowing content owners to prosper." Id.
7. Reihl, supra note 4, at 1762-63 (citing White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908)) (holding creation of piano rolls using copy-
righted music not infringing act); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362, affid 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (holding medi-
cal journal publisher's photocopying is considered "fair use" because it is non-
profit institution devoted to advancement of medical knowledge); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399 (1968) (holding cable
television company that relayed copyrighted material did not "perform" work and
did not infringe upon Copyright Act of 1909); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S.
55, 63 (1911) (holding "the film BEN HUR was photographic interpretation of
copyrighted story, the public exhibition of which constituted infringement");
Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1903) (holding motion pictures are simi-
lar to photographs, and therefore copyrightable); Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562,
565 (1901) (holding "phonograph reproduction did not violate copyright act,
since act is not 'publishing' or 'copying' within meaning of statute"); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGI-
TAL AGE, ch. 2, at http://books.nap.edu/html/digital-dilemma/ch2.html (lending
libraries viewed as threatening bookstores and publishers).
8. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 417 (ruling on legality of VCRs). Videocassette
sales and rentals are a ten billion dollar a year market with a total of $250 billion
invested in VCRs and VHS programming. See Joe Ryan, Blank Video Tape Market
Trends, PRC NEws, Jan. 11, 1999, at 5.
[Vol. 9: p. 57
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video cassette recorder "is to the American film producer
and the American public as the Boston Strangler is to the
woman alone." Perhaps telling for the dispute over Nap-
ster, those claims of doom have proven unsubstantiated. 9
This adaptive process promotes legitimate aims of copyright policy
in the United States.' 0 Innovative technologies such as Napster re-
sult in authors creating more works. These new works, along with
prior works, are distributed more broadly at a lower cost so that the
public has greater access to the intellectual heritage of the human
race. This process of course requires new business models and re-
wards courageous innovators at the possible expense of entrenched
interests. Egregious infringers merely free ride on the works of
others without even the possibility of a substantial non-infringing
use and without adding value or creating new markets." 1
9. Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology,
Copyright Liability, and the Possibility Of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYrON L. REv.
247, 252 n.20 (2001) (citing Adam Liptak and Diane Lahneer Zimmerman).
10. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1994) (explaining
goals and effects of copyright law).
While it is true that one of the goals of the Copyright Act is to discourage
infringement, it is by no means the only goal of that Act .... The imme-
diate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artis-
tic creativity.
Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see
also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(holding "[tihe rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors
to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors"); American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 941 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting defendant's fair
use defense to infringement of plaintiff's copyrighted materials).
Nowhere in the case law is there support for the proposition that the
monopoly granted by copyright is designed to ensure the holder a maxi-
mum economic return; rather, the law's purpose is to balance competing
interests-assuring the author afairreturn, while permitting creative uses
that build upon the author's work.
Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 941.
11. Napster's P2P technology reduced transaction costs to locate hard to find
music and permitted users to share MP3 files, a market that RIAA's members were
either unwilling or unable to exploit for commercial gain. The interwoven copy-
rights with contractual rights made licensing, usually the preferred option, prob-
lematic in the context of transmitting digital music. It is unclear which, if any, of
the traditional licensing entities could grant Napster a license. For example, on a
single CD, each track embodies at least two separate and distinct copyrighted
works. In particular, each track has a copyright for both the owner of the sound
recording and the owner of the composition. A single CD may have ten sound
recordings embodying the compositions of ten music publishers. "Now multiply
that times 3,000 record companies in the U.S., and 25,000 music publishers, [and]
27,000 new CDs per year. Separate individual negotiations for all these rights are
simply not a viable option." Napster CEO: Act of Congress Needed to Remedy Complicated
Licensing Morass that Threatens Internet Music, at http://www.napster.com/press-
room/pr/010403.html.
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With Napster, we memorialize a company that failed neither in
the marketplace nor in its technology, but instead in the courts.
The irony of this is that in slaying Napster, the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA") removed the one obstacle that
prevented technologies competing with Napster from flourishing.12
The technological or business models of these competing services
lack either the legal vulnerability of Napster under copyright or the
practical vulnerability of not having a technological central nervous
system against which courts may enforce orders. 13 As a result, while
courts may try to eradicate quasi-Napster and Napster-esque peer-
to-peer file swapping services, these services will remain until some
newer, better technology supplants them.14 This new technology
will assuredly present an entirely new set of problems for copyright
owners, would be infringers and legal pundits alike.
The theme of the symposium is the role of the missing direct
infringer in recent copyright law and what lessons a cyber entrepre-
neur should learn from Napster. This article argues that direct in-
fringers, before the bar of justice, serve a salutary purpose of giving
a human face to the legal offense, assisting in the fact finding pro-
cess and implicitly limiting the scope of the remedy to specifically
infringing uses. First, this article introduces Napster and its peer-to-
peer MP3 file sharing technology, and then discusses the trial and
appellate courts' analyses of the Napster case, including the theories
used to hold Napster liable. Further, this article analyzes the role of
the direct infringer in copyright law, and concludes with some les-
sons resulting from the Napster cases.
12. See Napster shutdown seen as potential boon for competitors, CNN, July 27, 2000,
available at http://wwwl.cnn.com/2000/LAW/07/27/napster.backlash/. "Other
music-sharing services that could benefit from a Napster shutdown include
Gnutella, Freenet, [Music City (i.e. Morpheus)], Scour Exchange, iMesh and
CuteMX. One service, Audiofind, responded to news of the injunction by posting
the message 'BYE BYE NAPSTER!!' on its Web site." Id.
13. See id. "The more than 100 central computers used by Napster made the
company a clear target for the lawsuit. However, the injunction is likely to have no
effect on Gnutella and other decentralized technologies in which song files are
traded directly among a constantly changing collection of computer users." Id.
14. See Aaron M. Bailey, A Nation of Felons?: Napster, the Net Act, and the Criminal
Prosecution of File-Sharing, 50 Am. U. L. REv. 473, 481 (2000). "Napster is but one of
a host of file-sharing platforms now in use. Other platforms include Gnutella and
Freenet that, unlike Napster, are examples of 'true' P2P software. These pure P2P
systems do not rely on central servers or a connection to a web site search engine."
Id. Because these types of software do not rely on a centralized system in order to
operate, there is no "point" at which a court may exercise its power. See id.
[Vol. 9: p. 57
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II. NAPSTER, INC.: THE COMPANY AND MusIcSHARE TECHNOLOGY
Napster is a California based Internet start-up company that
made its proprietary MusicShare software freely available on the In-
ternet. 15 Napster began as an attempt by a college student to facili-
tate music swapping among friends. 16 "[T]he Napster service gives
its users the unprecedented ability to 'locate music by their favorite
artists in MP3 format."1 7 The contribution that Napster made to
the Internet community was the ability to "conduct relatively sophis-
ticated searches for music files on the hard drives of millions of
other anonymous users."' 8 At one point, Napster grew at a rate of
more than 200% per month, and users shared approximately
10,000 MP3 files per second.' 9 At its peak, approximately 100 users
per second attempted to log into a Napster server. 20 While Napster
is a for-profit entity, it provided its services to Internet users free of
charge. 21 The underlying Napster business model was never en-
tirely clear, but court documents suggest that the company planned
to avoid profit maximization (or even profit) until it reached a criti-
cal mass of users and MP3 files.2 2 At this unspecified point, Napster
15. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (describing how users who obtain Napster's software can then share MP3
music files with others logged-on to Napster system and MP3 files, which
reproduce nearly CD-quality sound in compressed format, are available on variety
of websites either for fee or free-of-charge). Napster allows users to exchange MP3
files stored on their own computer hard-drives directly, without payment. See id.
16. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd
in part, Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating Napster, Inc. is start-up
company based in San Mateo, California). "Although Napster was the brainchild
of a college student who wanted to facilitate music-swapping by his roommate....
it is far from a simple tool of distribution among friends and family." Id.
17. Id. at 901 (noting "[Napster] takes the frustration out of locating servers
with MP3 files by providing a peer-to-peer file sharing system").
18. Id. at 902 (quoting Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136, at *1) (noting Napster
will increase volume of music companies online sales by stimulating consumer in-
vestment in hardware and software needed to obtain and play MP3 files).
19. See id. (describing value of system grows as quantity and quality of available
music increases).
20. See id. (emphasizing downloading on Napster has potential to disrupt pro-
motional efforts of music companies because it does not involve any restrictions on
timing, amount, or selection they impose when they offer free music files). On
Napster, the user and not the copyright owner determines how much music they
want to sample and how long they will keep it. See id.
21. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (noting at time of decision, Napster
collected no revenues and charges its clientele no fees). The plan was to delay the
maximization of revenues while attracting a large user-base. See id. Napster, subse-
quent to the litigation, moved to a subscription model. See Germany's Berterlsmann
Say's It Plans to Offer Subscriptions to Napster, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2001, at A4.
22. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (noting Napster asserts music compa-
nies suffer no injury, or de minimis injury, and rebuts presumption of irreparable
harm). Napster does not contend that downloading entire copyrighted songs is de
5
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planned to monetize its user base through targeted email, advertis-
ing, commissioned links to commercial websites and direct market-
ing. 23 Some estimates valued Napster's user base between sixty and
eighty million dollars.24
Using a paradigm commonly called "peer-to-peer file shar-
ing, '25 Napster's MusicShare software facilitated the transmission of
MP3 files among its users. 26 MP3 files are near compact disk-quality
sound recordings in a compressed format.2 7 Compared to other
digital audio formats, MP3 files are smaller, require less time and
are better suited for transmission over the Internet.28 Napster and
its MusicShare software allowed users to share MP3 music files
stored on individual computer hard drives with other Napster users
across the Internet. 29 MusicShare would catalog individual com-
minimis copying, but rather that obtaining music using Napster does not displace
CD sales. See id.
23. See id. (noting Napster's thoughts on charging fees for premium or com-
mercial version of its software). A large user base that increases daily makes Nap-
ster, Inc. an attractive acquisition for larger, more established firms. See id.
24. See id. Napster Inc.'s value is measured in part, by the size of its user base.
See id. After the onset of the litigation, Napster obtained substantial capital infu-
sions. See id. "[I]n May 2000, the venture firm Hummer Winblad purchased a
twenty-percent ownership interest in the company for 13 million dollars, other
investors simultaneously invested 1.5 million dollars." Id.
25. "Peer-to-Peer [is] a type of network in which each workstation has
equivalent capabilities and responsibilities." InSync Daily Music Industry News &
Tips, Word for the Day Archive, available at http://www.sweetwater.com/insync/
word.tpl?find=peer-to-peer (last visited Oct. 17, 2001).
26. See Free On-line Dictionary of Computing (FOLDOC), MP3, at http://
foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?query=MP3.
MP3 [is] a digital audio compression algorithm that achieves a compression
factor of about twelve while preserving sound quality. It does this by optimis-
ing the compression according to the range of sound that people can
actually hear. MP3 is currently (July 1999) the most powerful algorithm
in a series of audio encoding standards developed under the sponsorship
of the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) and formalised by the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization (ISO).
Id. (emphasis added); see also Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (describing consum-
ers can acquire MP3 files in two ways; first, users may download audio recordings
that have already been converted into MP3 format by using Internet service such as
Napster and secondly, users can "rip" software to copy audio compact discs directly
on to their computer hard drive). Ripping the software compresses the millions of
bytes of information on a typical CD into a smaller MP3 file that requires a fraction
of the storage space. See Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
27. SeeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (noting MP3 is popular, standard format used to store audio files).
28. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (adding player software enables con-
sumers to play MP3 files and such software is available on Internet, possibly free of
charge, and may be part of bundled software sold by PC manufacturers).
29. See Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (stating people who have downloaded
Napster software can log-on to Napster system and share MP3 music files with
other users who are also logged-on to system).
[Vol. 9: p. 57
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puter hard drives for MP3 music files, make the music files available
for copying by other Napster users, and transfer exact copies of the
users' MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet.30
The Napster model enabled speedy searches by sending the MP3
file catalogs from individual computer hard drives to central serv-
ers.31 The Napster central servers processed searches by obtaining
queries from MusicShare users, and identified individual computer
users holding MP3 files that matched the queries.32 Upon identify-
ing individual computer users with matching query results, a music
file transfer took place only between the requesting and supplying
user, i.e., between peers.33
These functions were made possible by Napster's MusicShare
software, available free of charge from Napster's Internet site, and
Napster's 150 network servers and server-side software.3 4 "Napster
provide[d] technical support for the indexing and searching of
MP3 files .... including a 'chat room,' where users c[ould] meet to
discuss music, and a directory where participating artists c[ould]
provide information about their music."3 5 "Napster allow[ed] a
user to locate other users' MP3 files in two ways: [(1)] through
Napster's search function and [(2)] through its 'hotlist' func-
tion."3 6
30. See id. at *1-2 (noting Napster users can upload or download MP3 files
without payment to each other, Napster, or copyright owners).
31. See id. (describing MusicShare software interacts with Napster's server-side
software when user logs on, automatically connecting user to one of some 150
servers that Napster operates; MusicShare software reads list of names of MP3 files
that user has elected to make available).
32. See id. (noting MusicShare software reads list of names of MP3 files that
user has elected to make available). The list is then added to a directory that users
can search through to find the desired song and can then download it onto their
hard drive. See id.
33. See id. (explaining user may also view list of files that exist on another
user's hard drive and select file from that list).
34. See Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *1-2 ("The MP3 file is actually transmitted
over the Internet, but the steps necessary to make that connection could not take
place without the Napster server."). "The Napster system has other functions be-
sides allowing users to search for, request, and download MP3 files. For example, a
requesting user can play a downloaded song using the MusicShare software. Nap-
ster also hosts a chat room." Id.
35. Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (commenting Napster fa-
cilitates transmission of MP3 files between and among its users through process
called "peer-to-peer" file sharing).
36. Id. at 1012. A Napster user may create a "hot list" of other users with
similar musical tastes or interests. See id. If a hotlisted user logs on, the system
alerts the user. See id. "[T]he user can [then] access an index of all MP3 file
names in a particular hotlisted user's library and request [any] file" by clicking on
the file name. Id. "The contents of the hotlisted user's MP3 file are not stored on
the Napster system." Id.
7
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A computer user's introduction to Napster began by download-
ing the MusicShare software.37 After downloading and installing
the MusicShare software, a user could access the Napster server-side
software when the user logged on to one of 150 Napster servers.38
As part of the setup process, the user created an account name and
password.3 9 Napster did not link the user's name and password
with any biographical, demographical, or other individually identi-
fying information. 40 Logging on to the system allowed Napster
users to exchange copyrighted MP3 files without paying copyright
holders, obtaining a license or other permission, or paying other
users.
41
"The [MusicShare] software [consisted of] a browser interface,
search engine, and chat functions that operate[d] in conjunction"
with the Napster servers.42 The MusicShare software permits a user
to search for MP3 files by name from other users' MP3 file libraries
that have been made available.43 A user may search available MP3
files by song, name or artist.44 When the user clicks on the name of
a file, the Napster server communicates with the requesting user's
computer and the "host user's"'45 computer to create a link between
the two users so that downloading can begin. 46 The Napster server
37. See Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (noting Napster server gets necessary
IP address information from host user, enabling requesting user to connect to
host).
38. See id. (stating Napster developed policy making compliance with all copy-
right laws "term of use" of its service and warns users "Napster will terminate the
accounts of users who are repeat infringers of the copyrights, or other intellectual
property rights, of others"). In addition, there is a provision that states "Napster
reserves the right to terminate the account of a user upon any single infringement
of the rights of others in conjunction with use of the Napster service." Id.
39. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
40. See id. (noting after user logs-on, user's physical address information is no
longer available to Napster server).
41. SeeJames E. Murrill,Jr., Sounds and Silence: Downloading and Fair Use in A &
M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 24 AM. J. TRiLk ADvoc. 469, 469-70 (2000).
42. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (describing Napster software may be used
to play and categorize audio files that can be stored in specific file directories on
user's hard drives). These directories are referred to as the "user libraries;" some
users use such directories and others do not. See id.
43. See Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *1-2. The MP3 file names are the names
given by the host user to the MP3 file. See id.
44. See id. (explaining if user wants to locate song, she enters song's name or
name of recording artist on search page of MusicShare program and clicks "Find
It" button).
45. See id. at *1 n.2 (noting "host user" is one who is making MP3 file available
for downloading).
46. See id. at *1. "When the requesting user clicks on the name of a file, the
Napster server communicates with the requesting user's and host user's Music-
Share software browser to facilitate a connection between the two users and initiate
the downloading of the file without any further action on either user's part." Id.
[Vol. 9: p. 57
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then routes the request to the host computer's Napster interface
browser.47 The host computer's browser responds whether or not it
can supply the requested file.48 "If the host [computer] can supply
the file, the Napster server communicates the host's address and
routing information to the requesting user's browser, allowing the
requesting user to make [the] connection ... and receive the ...
file." 49 Napster locations are transient.50 User locations are added
or deleted each time the user logs on or off the system. 51 The file is
transmitted over the Internet and not through the Napster server.52
All files reside on the computers of Napster users and are directly
transmitted between the hard drives of the host and recipient ma-
chines. 53 The files do not ever reside on or transit through a Napster
server, which is why Napster has strong arguments against possible
claims that it directly infringed copyrighted works, but this technol-
ogy model made asserting a defense under section 512 of the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act problematic. 5 4
III. A&M R.EcoRDs, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC.
Napster did not violate the Copyright Act directly because file
interchange did not involve its servers directly containing or trans-
mitting music files. "The Copyright Act... [does] not include any
statutory provision providing for [secondary] liability [for copyright
infringement.]" 55 The lack of such a statutory provision does not
47. See id. at *2 (explaining to download desired file, user highlights it on list
and clicks "Get Selected Songs" button).
48. See Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *2.
49. Id. ("The parties disagree about whether this process involves a hypertext
link that the Napster server-side software provides.").
50. See id.
51. See Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). "Indeed, after a user logs-on, her physical
address information is no longer available to the Napster server." Id.
52. See Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *2 (explaining Napster only facilitates
transmission between users).
53. See id. at *8 (emphasis added). "Nevertheless, the court finds that Napster
does not provide connection 'through' its system." Id.
54. See id. (emphasizing files not on Napster server).
55. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12.04[A],at 12-66.1. "Congress' use of the phrase 'to authorize' establishes the
liability, whether vicarious or as a contributory infringer, of one who does no more
than cause or permit another to engage in an infringing act." Id. at 12-66.1 to -67;
see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5674. "Use of the phrase 'to authorize' is intended to avoid any questions as to the
liability of contributory infringers." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61.
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prevent courts from imposing liability on parties who have not di-
rectly infringed under the Copyright Act.5 6
In delineating the contours of this third-party liability, and
because copyright is analogous to a species of tort, "com-
mon law concepts of tort liability are relevant in fixing the
scope of the statutory copyright remedy . . . ." Guided,
therefore, by well established precepts of tort liability, it
appears that two avenues of third-party liability in copy-
right have grown up in the law - "vicarious liability"
(grounded in the tort concept of respondeat superior) and
"contributory infringement" (founded on the tort concept
of enterprise liability) .57
These common law doctrines, not codified in the Copyright Act,
allowed the plaintiffs stated claim against Napster.
The plaintiffs alleged that Napster was a contributory and vica-
rious copyright infringer.58 After receiving evidence, the district
court preliminarily enjoined Napster "from engaging in, or facilitat-
ing others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or dis-
tributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and sound
recordings, protected by either federal or state law, without express
permission of the rights owner."59 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in
56. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
"[V]icarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of
contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identify-
ing the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the
actions of another." Id.
57. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1966)). "[T]he lines between direct infringement, contributory infringe-
ment, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn." Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at
435 n.17).
58. See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). Although there is
evidence in the record to support such a claim, the plaintiffs did not allege that
Napster, Inc. was a direct infringer. See id. Evidence in the record included Nap-
ster, Inc. executives and employees downloading and storing copyrighted MP3 files
on office machines. See Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). "Plaintiffs are engaged in the
commercial recording, distribution and sale of copyrighted musical compositions
and sound recordings." NapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1010-11. On December 6,1999, A &
M Records and seventeen other record companies filed a complaint, and approxi-
mately a month later, plaintiffs Jerry Leiber, Mike Stoller, and Frank Music Corpo-
ration filed a complaint on behalf of a class of similarly situated music publishers.
See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
59. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (noting this injunction applies to all such
works plaintiffs own and is not limited to those listed in two schedules of
complaint).
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part and remanded for further proceedings. 60 Although the trial
court's record is worthy of discussion, 6 1 this section will focus on
the Napster case as it was decided by the Ninth Circuit and will be
largely limited to the facts in the case as discussed in the appellate
decision.
A. Claims
"To prevail on a contributory or vicarious copyright infringe-
ment claim, a plaintiff must show direct infringement by a third
party. ' 62 In order to show direct infringement, the plaintiffs "must
show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and . . . must
demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive
right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106."'63
1. Direct Infringement
"Secondary liability for copyright infringement does not exist
in the absence of direct infringement by a third party. '64 Napster
did not appeal the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs
presented a prima facie case of direct infringement by Napster
users.65 As a result, the Ninth Circuit limited itself to the observa-
tion that, "[t]he record supports the district court's determination
that as much as eighty seven percent of the files available on Nap-
ster may be copyrighted and more than seventy percent may be
60. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1029 (holding preliminary injunction issued by
district court prior to appeal shall remain stayed until it is modified by district
court to conform to requirements of opinion). A partial remand of the case was
ordered to permit the district court to proceed with the settlement and entry of
the modified preliminary injunction. See id.
61. See generally Shawn D. Chapman, Pushing the Limits of Copyright Law and
Upping the Ante in the Digital World: The Strange Case ofA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 89 Ky. L. REv. 703 (2001).
62. Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 434). But see ITSI
T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Cal. Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. Cal.
1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding Congress
created new form of "direct" infringement when it amended Copyright Act to in-
clude words "to authorize," and individuals may be contributorily or vicariously
liable for such direct acts of infringement).
63. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1013 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501 (a) (1994)) (explaining
infringement occurs when alleged infringer engages in activity listed in § 106).
64. Id. at n.2. "There can be no contributory infringement by a defendant
without direct infringement by another." Id. (quoting Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
65. See id. at 1013 (addressing threshold requirements of infringement and
fair use).
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owned or administered by plaintiffs. '66 The district court further
determined that plaintiffs' exclusive rights under section 106 were
violated. Pursuant to this determination, the Ninth Circuit ex-
plained that, "here the evidence establishes that a majority of Nap-
ster users use the service to download and upload copyrighted
music .... And by doing that the uses constitute direct infringe-
ment of plaintiffs' musical compositions, [and] recordings. ' 67 Nap-
ster users infringed at least two of the copyright holders' exclusive
rights, which are the right of reproduction under section 106(1)
and the right of distribution under section 106(3).68 Napster users
who upload file names for others to copy violate the plaintiffs' dis-
tribution rights. 69 Also, "Napster users who download files contain-
ing copyrighted music violate plaintiffs' reproduction rights."70
A copyright owner's exclusive rights under section 106 are not
absolute. Section 106 rights, for example, are limited by sections
107-121, the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act. 7 1 "Napster
contend[ed] that its users [did] not directly infringe plaintiffs'
copyrights because the users [were] engaged in fair use of the mate-
rial."72 In particular, Napster identified three specific fair uses:
"sampling, where users make temporary copies of a work before
purchasing; space-shifting, where users access a sound recording
through the Napster system that they already own in audio CD for-
mat and; permissive distribution of recordings by both new and es-
66. Id. (quoting NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911) (noting plaintiffs must sat-
isfy two requirements to present prima facie case of direct infringement). The two
requirements are that plaintiffs must show (1) ownership of the material and (2)
that the infringers violated at least one exclusive right granted to the copyright
holders. See id. The court held "[p]laintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated owner-
ship." Id.
67. Id. at 1013-14 (quoting A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, 2000 WL 1009483,
at *1 (N.D. Cal.July 26, 2000)) (stating that district court also noted Napster pretty
much acknowledged their behavior consituted infringement).
68. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014 (agreeing with lower court determination
that Napster violated two exclusive rights in copyright).
69. See id. (agreeing plaintiffs have shown Napster users infringe at least two
of copyright holders' exclusive rights: rights of reproduction and rights of
distribution).
70. Id. (noting Napster's affirmative defense to charge that its users directly
infringe plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings).
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). "Subject to sections 107 through 121, the
owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following ...." Id.
72. NapsterlI, 239 F.3d at 1014. "The fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not
an infringement of copyright." Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
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tablished artists. 73 "Fair use" requires the court to balance at least
the four factors enumerated in section 107 of the Copyright Act.74
The factors the court must consider include: "(1) the purpose and
character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the 'amount and substantiality of the portion used' in relation to
the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the poten-
tial market for the work or the value of the work. '75
The first factor, "the purpose and character of the use," focuses
on whether the alleged infringing work is a mere substitute for the
original or whether it has a different nature or character. 76 "In
other words, this factor asks 'whether and to what extent the new
work is transformative."' 77 In evaluating the "purpose and charac-
ter" factor, the district court must also "determine whether the al-
leged infringing use is commercial or noncommercial." 78 "The
district court concluded that downloading MP3 files does not trans-
form the copyrighted work."79 Rather, the work was merely copied
from the host computer to the recipient's computer without any
transformation.80 The second element in the "purpose and charac-
ter of use" factor required the district court to consider whether the
use was commercial or noncommercial. 81 A finding of "[a] com-
mercial use weighs against a finding of fair use."'82 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's finding that Napster users
participated in infringing use that was commercial in nature:
The district court determined that Napster users en-
gag[ed] in commercial use of the copyrighted materials
73. Id. (noting district court first conducted general analysis of reasoning to
alleged fair uses identified by Napster and then concluded Napster users are not
fair users).
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (listing four factors guiding fair use
determination).
75. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1014 (paraphrasing § 107 requirements).
76. See id. at 1015 (explaining function of first factor).
77. Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
78. Id. (referring to commercial-noncommercial distinction).
79. Id. (citing Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 854, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), afjd in part,
rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
80. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015. "Courts have been reluctant to find fair
use when an original work is merely retransmitted in a different medium." Id.
81. See id. (noting commercial use is demonstrated by showing that repeated
and exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were made to save ex-
pense of purchasing authorized copies). But see Kelly v. Ariba Scott Corp., 77 F.
Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that a search engine which permitted
users to search images online and reproduce them in thumbnail format was
transformative).
82. NapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1015 (describing commercial use as strong indicator
against fair use).
13
Gibbons: Napster: The Case for the Need for a Missing Direct Infringer
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
70 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
because (1) "a host user sending a file cannot be said to
engage in a personal use when distributing that file to an
anonymous requester" and (2) Napster users get for free
something they would ordinarily have to buy.83
According to the Ninth Circuit, a "[d] irect economic benefit is not
required to demonstrate a commercial use," but "rather, repeated
and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies
are not offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use.."84
The second factor that the court must consider is the "nature
of the use" of the copyrighted work.85 Creative works are "closer to
the core of intended copyright protection" than are more fact-
based works because copyright protects creative expression rather
that facts.86 The district court found that "copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings are creative in nature.., which
cuts against a finding of fair use under the second factor."8 7
The third factor that the court must consider is "the amount
and substantiality of the portion used."88 "While 'wholesale copy-
ing does not preclude fair use per se,' copying an entire work 'mili-
tates against a finding of fair use.' "89 The trial court found that
Napster users copied entire works.90 The Ninth Circuit further de-
termined this factor weighed against a finding of fair use. 91
The fourth factor is the "effect of use on the market for copy-
righted work."92 "Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to cop-
ying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of
83. Id. (quoting Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912). The district court also
found persuasive authority in the No Electronic Theft Act. See id. "[T] he defini-
tion of a financially motivated transaction for the purposes of criminal copyright
actions includes trading infringing copies of a work for other items, 'including the
receipt of other copyrighted works.'" Id. (citing No Electronic Theft Act ("NET
Act"), Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 stat. 2678 (1997) 18 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
84. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015 (explaining Napster counters even if certain
users engage in commercial use by downloading instead of purchasing music,
space-shifting and sampling are nevertheless noncommercial in nature).
85. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1016 (addressing second fair use factor).
86. Id. at 1016 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
87. Id. (quoting Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913).
88. See id. (noting under certain circumstances, court may conclude use is fair
even when protected work is copied in its entirety).
89. Id. (quoting World Wide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227
F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
90. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1016 (citing Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913).
91. See id. at 1016 (citing World Wide, 227 F.3d at 1118). See generally Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (acknowledging fair use
of time-shifting necessarily involves making full copy of protected work).
92. See id.
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the work which is copied. '93 The district court found that Napster
harmed the actual market for the copyrighted works and created an
entry barrier preventing the copyright owners from exploiting the
potential market for their works in a digital online format.94 It is
irrelevant whether the copyright owner exploits or even intends to
exploit a market. There mere fact that there is a potential for the
work and the alleged infringing use has an adverse effect on the
market is enough.95
"Napster maintain led] that its identified uses of sampling and
space-shifting were wrongly excluded as fair uses by the district
court."96 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that sampling, even by individual users who ultimately purchase the
music, was not a fair use.9 7 "Napster also maintain[ed] that space-
shifting is a fair use."98 "Space-shifting occurs when a Napster user
downloads MP3 music files in order to listen to music" the user has
previously purchased. 99 The Ninth Circuit noted that "once a user
lists a copy of music he already owns on the Napster system in order
to access the music from another location, the song becomes 'avail-
able to millions of other individuals' not just the original CD
owner."100 Having found direct infringement that was not excused
by section 107 of the Copyright Act, the court then proceeded to
analyze Napster's liability as a secondary infringer.101
93. Id. (quoting Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
566-67 (1985)).
94. See id. (discussing harm Napster's conduct caused to market).
95. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
96. NaspterI, 239 F.3d at 1017.
97. See id. at 1019. The Napster court conflated two uses when they respec-
tively held and affirmed that space-shifting was not a fair use. See id. Insofar as the
individual user space-shifts music the user already owned, it was a fair use. See id.
Once the music is available to millions through the Internet and users download it,
their use of the music does not necessarily constitute a fair use. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id. This rhetorical argument does not address the space-shifting fair use
contention. A user posting music so that he or she may listen to it at a different
location is space-shifting and arguably a fair use for the user. The acts of others
downloading the music may not be a fair use. The user, therefore, is excused
while others are infringers.
100. Id. This logic echoes the dissent in Sony. Acts that are harmless in isola-
tion may be harmful in the aggregate. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 480-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019 (addressing contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement claims).
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2. Contributory Infringement
"Traditionally, 'one who, with knowledge of the infringing ac-
tivity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory in-
fringer."" 0 2 "[L]iability exists if the defendant engages in 'per-
sonal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement.' 1 0 3
"Contributory liability requires that the secondary infringer 'know
or have reason to know' of direct infringement."1 04
The Ninth Circuit court followed Sony's guidance on substan-
tial noninfringing uses.10 5 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated
that:
The Sony Court declined to impute the requisite level of
knowledge where the defendants made and sold equip-
ment capable of both infringing and "substantial nonin-
fringing uses" ..... We are bound to follow Sony, and will
not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster
merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may
be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights. 10 6
The district court found that Napster had actual knowledge for two
reasons. First, Napster co-founder Sean Parker acknowledged "the
need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses
'since they are exchanging pirated music.""10 7 Second, the RIAA
notified Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files. 108 The dis-
trict court found the following evidence of constructive knowledge:
"(a) Napster executives have recording industry experience; (b)
they have enforced intellectual property rights in other instances;
(c) Napster executives have downloaded copyrighted songs from
the system; and (d) they have promoted the site with 'screen shots
listing infringing files.'"109 Because Napster executives knew of spe-
cific infringing materials and failed to remove that material, Nap-
102. Id. (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
103. Id. (quoting Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706
(2d Cir. 1998)).
104. Id. at 1020 (explaining constructive and actual knowledge requirements)
(quoting Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d
829, 845-46 n.29 (11th Cir. 1990)).
105. See id.
106. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 1020 n.5 (quoting Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 (9th Cir.
2001) affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)).
108. See id. (citing Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919).
109. Id. (quoting Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919).
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ster contributed to direct infringement. 1 0 Napster, therefore,
materially contributed to the direct infringement of the copyrights
because "[w]ithout the support services defendant provides, Nap-
ster users could not find and download the music they want with
the ease of which defendant boasts." '1 1 1
3. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
The district court found and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that
Napster engaged in vicarious copyright infringement. 112 "Vicarious
copyright liability is an 'outgrowth' of respondeat superior." 113 "In
the context of copyright law, vicarious liability extends beyond an
employer/employee relationship to cases in which a defendant 'has
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has
a direct financial interest in such activities. "' 114
Financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing
material "acts as a 'draw' for customers." Ample evidence
supports the district court's finding that Napster's future
revenue is directly dependent upon "increases in
userbase." More users register with the Napster system as
the "quality and quantity of available music increases .... "
The district court determined that Napster has the right
and ability to supervise its users' conduct.
The ability to block infringers' access to a particular
environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the
right and ability to supervise .... Napster ha[d] an ex-
press reservation of rights policy, stating on its website that
it expressly reserves the "right to refuse service and termi-
nate accounts in [its] discretion, including, but not lim-
ited to, if Napster believes that user conduct violates
applicable law ... or for any reason in Napster's sole dis-
cretion, with or without cause." To escape imposition of
110. See id. at 1022 (concluding Napster's knowledge and failure to act consti-
tuted contributory infringement).
111. Id. (quoting Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919-20).
112. See id. at 1024. "Our review of the record requires us to accept the dis-
trict court's conclusion that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits of the vicarious copyright infringement claim." Id.
113. Id. at 1022 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
262 (9th Cir. 1996)).
114. Id. (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
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vicarious liability, the reserved right to police must be ex-
ercised to its fullest extent.
11 5
Finally, the Napster court found that the "staple article of com-
merce" doctrine "provides a defense only to contributory infringe-
ment, not to vicarious infringement."' 1 6
B. Defenses
Napster buttressed its position with a plethora of defenses." 7
In particular, Napster asserted defenses under the Audio Home Re-
cording Act of 1992 ("AHRA"), the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA"), 118 an implied license defense and the copyright
misuse doctrine. The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected all of these
defenses. 119
Napster asserted that its users engaged in actions protected by
the AHRA120 and the DMCA, 121 which limit both liability for con-
tributory and vicarious infringement. 122 The district court held the
AHRA "'irrelevant' to the action because: (1) plaintiffs did not
bring claims under the AHRA; and (2) the AHRA does not cover
the downloading of MP3 files."123 The Ninth Circuit agreed that
115. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1023 (citations omitted) (stating if right to police
is not used to fullest extent, it will give rise to liability).
116. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting 617 PLI/Pat 455, 528 (Sept. 2,
2000)).
117. See id. at 1024 (stating if Napster asserted valid defenses, entry of prelimi-
nary injunction would be precluded).
118. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1999).
119. See NapsterI, 239 F.3d at 1024 (holding AHRA does not cover download-
ing MP3 files to computer hard drives). The DMCA is not applicable per se, but
must be more fully developed at trial. See id. at 1025. The record supports the
conclusion that no evidence exists for an implied license defense and that there
was no error in the district court's rejection of copyright misuse doctrine as a de-
fense for Napster. See id. at 1026.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008. "No action may be brought under [The Audio Home
Recording Act] alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importa-
tion, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording
medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or based on
the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musi-
cal recordings or analog musical recordings." Id. (emphasis added).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
122. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1024 (stating Napster asserted their users en-
gaged in actions protected by AHRA and Napster's liability was limited through
DMCA).
123. Id. (citing Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 n.19 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)) (holding AHRA is irrelevant to
instant action because neither party brought claims under Act and MP3 files are
not covered under Act). The court was free to apply 17 U.S.C. § 1008 by analogy as
an addition to the four § 107 "fair use" factors. See id. The four enumerated fac-
tors under § 107 are not exhaustive. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
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"the [AHRA] does not cover the downloading of MP3 files to com-
puter hard drives."' 24 The court reasoned that "[u]nder the plain
meaning of the [AHRA's] definition of digital audio recording de-
vices, computers (and their hard drives) are not digital audio re-
cording devices because their 'primary purpose' is not to make
digital audio copied recordings."125
Napster also asserted "the protections of the safe harbor from
copyright infringement suits for Internet service providers con-
tained in the [DMCA]" as a defense. 126 The Ninth Circuit found
this issue to be best addressed on a complete record at trial. 127 A
substantial question of whether the safe harbor provisions of the
DMCA are applicable to secondary infringers, therefore, remains
unanswered. 128
Napster also argued that "plaintiffs granted the company an
implied license by encouraging MP3 file exchanges over the In-
ternet."129 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this defense because courts
tend to find implied licenses only when one party "created a work
at [the other's] request and handed it over, intending that [the
other] copy and distribut[ing] it."130
Finally, Napster asserted a defense under the emerging doc-
trine of copyright misuse.' 3 ' The copyright misuse doctrine "for-
bids a copyright holder from 'secur[ing] an exclusive right or
limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright Office.'"132 The
defense of copyright misuse applies when a copyright owner at-
tempts to use his or her limited monopoly to gain an advantage in
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (holding "the statute notes four nonexclusive
factors to be considered"). The Napster court could have looked to § 1008 as indi-
cating a congressional intent that non-commercial consumer digital copies are a
"fair use" of a copyrighted work. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024.
124. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024.
125. Id. The implicit recognition by the court of space-shifting, under the
RHRA should be persuasive analogous authority of space-shifting as a fair use
under the Copyright Act.
126. Id. at 1025 (citing Napsterl, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919 n.24) (stating Napster
asserted safe harbor protections under DMCA as possible defense to limit liability
from copyright infringement suit).
127. See id. (stating DMCA is not applicable per se).
128. See id. (holding it would "not accept a blanket conclusion that § 512 of
the [DMCA] will never protect secondary infringers").
129. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1026.
130. Id. (quoting SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson
Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2000)).
131. See id. (setting out Napster's alleged copyright misuse defense).
132. Id. (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977-79 (4th
Cir. 1990)).
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an area outside the monopoly granted by law. 133 Napster alleged
that "on-line distribution is not within the copyright monopoly."13 4
"According to Napster, plaintiffs colluded to 'use their copyrights to
extend their control to online distributions.' 1 35 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, found that the plaintiffs merely sought to enforce
their rights under section 106 of the Copyright Act.136
IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE DIREcT INFRINGER
As was briefly referred to earlier, one cannot be found liable as
a secondary infringer unless there was a direct infringer.1 37 Be-
cause Napster did not appeal the district court's finding of direct
infringement, the Ninth Circuit did not address this issue and
stated that the evidence established direct infringement of the
plaintiffs musical recordings.138 As a result, it is the district court's
opinion that provides the analysis in reaching this conclusion.
The trial court found that as much as eighty-seven percent of
the music available on Napster is already copyrighted.1 39 The court
based this conclusion on the expert testimony produced by the
plaintiffs.1 40 The basic premise that eighty-seven percent of the
133. See id. (stating "the misuse defense prevents copyright holders from
leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside the
monopoly").
134. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1026.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 1027 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994)) (holding there was no
evidence plaintiffs sought to control areas outside their grant of monopoly and
instead only sought to control reproduction and distribution of their copyrighted
works).
137. See id. at 1013. "Secondary liability for copyright infringement does not
exist in the absence of direct infringement by a third party." Id. at n.2 (citing
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995)) (holding "[t]here can be no contributory infringe-
ment by a defendant without direct infringement by another").
138. See id. at 1014 (stating that because evidence established majority of Nap-
ster users downloaded copyrighted music, it constituted direct infringement of
plaintiffs' musical compositions and recordings).
139. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902-03, affd in part, rev'd in part, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). ("The evidence shows that virtually all Napster users
download or upload copyrighted files and that vast majority of the music available
on Napster is copyrighted.").
140. See id. at 903 n.6 (stating plaintiffs expert produced hard evidence that
plaintiffs or other copyright holders own or administer rights to 87.1 percent of
files that are transferred via Napster). We can also consider the written findings of
the trial court which explain in greater detail the evidentiary predicate for its find-
ing. See id.
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Ingram Olkin, a professor of statistics at Stan-
ford University, divided his study into two projects. In the User Project, a
sample list of users and file names was taken every hour for four days.
Researchers culled a random sub-sample of 1,150 users from 28,000 sam-
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MP3 files available using the Napster service were copyrighted
should have only been the starting point in the district court's analy-
sis, rather than the sufficient cause to prove unlawful copying and a
corresponding shift to consider the paradigmatic affirmative de-
fenses available under the copyright law. 141
The district court's opinion focused largely on the sheer enor-
mity of the Napster enterprise. 142 In particular, the district court
classified a large category of potentially legitimate uses as infringe-
ment.143 The district court believed all unauthorized copying and
distribution of copyright-protected material by Napster was ille-
gal. 144 Yet, this case did not necessarily involve a direct infringer. 145
The district court erroneously conflated unauthorized use with in-
fringing use because the district court's analysis took a global view
of whether collective activities by Napster users were excused under
pled and determined that all 1,150 users offered to share at least two
copyrighted songs. The Download Project performed downloads at eight
separate times for a five-minute period and generated a list of 1,150 songs
from a population of approximately 574,185 files. Olkin found that plain-
tiffs or other copyright holders own or administer the rights to 1,002 (or
87.1 [%]) of the 1,150 files. Thirty-seven (or 3.2[%]) of the files are likely
to be copyrighted and distributed without authorization. Dr. Olkin identi-
fied only three files (or .26[%]) which were clearly offered without objec-
tion from the rights holder, while 108 (or 9.4[%]) of the files did not
present enough data to yield a conclusion. Charles J. Hausman, anti-
piracy counsel for the RLAA, determined that 834 out of 1,150 files in
Olkin's download database belonged to or were administered by plaintiffs
and were exchanged on Napster without permission.
Id.
141. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-121, § 1008 (1994) (asserting various affirma-
tive defenses under copyright law).
142. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (stating at one point Napster was
growing by more than 200% per month, that 10,000 MP3 files were shared per
second and every second over 100 users attempted to connect to system).
143. See id. at 914 (ruling "[t]he global scale of Napster usage and the fact
that users avoid paying for songs that otherwise would not be free militates against
a determination that the sampling by Napster users constitutes personal or home
use in the traditional sense"). The nature of the sound recordings are creative, so
Napster cannot argue that they are entitled under a fair use defense to undermine
copyright laws. See id. at 913.
144. See id at 927.
145. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 447 (1984) (citing
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1975)) ("Even un-
authorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing. An unli-
censed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of
the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute."). The definition
of exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106 is subject to §§ 107-118, and those sec-
tions describe a number of uses of copyrighted material that would not be in-
fringements despite the § 106 provisions. See id. There is little doubt, however,
that due to the large user population of Napster, at least one of the users was a
direct infringer, but "knowing something" and "proving something" are quite dif-
ferent. See id.
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the theory of fair use. This approach was also adopted by the Ninth
Circuit. 146 However, Napster's individual users may have been pro-
tected under some paradigm of fair use because fair use is always an
individual determination that depends upon the unique facts of the
particular alleged infringing use. 147 Because no alleged direct in-
fringers were before the court, the court could therefore rely on a
sense of collective wrongdoing as it assumed at least some use must
be an infringing use due to the sheer size of the Napster
enterprise.148
Some examples of potential non-infringing uses that result in
"direct infringement" under this collectivist paradigm include: a
law professor demonstrating Napster for a Cyberlaw class; an inves-
tigating attorney; a judge or law clerk downloading certain files for
a better understanding of the issues in the case; members of the
media demonstrating Napster as part of a news story; or individuals
privately distributing MP3 files from Napster to friends or acquaint-
ances.' 49 These uses are examples of possible fair uses of Napster
by individual users. While Napster might have some fair uses, the
purpose of copyright law is to protect the public's interest by pro-
viding authors with an economic incentive to create new works.150
In a case where a service or technology is being enjoined, not be-
cause of its own bad acts, but because it permits others to act unlaw-
fully, the court should hear from the putative direct infringers in
order to determine any impact on the public interest. One com-
mentator suggested a better reading of Sony on the context of Nap-
ster: "Courts must considers the defendant's product as a whole
rather than focusing on a single component of it. If a court
reached this inquiry in Napster, for example, it would ask whether
146. See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with
district court that Napster users are not fair user).
147. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) (holding "no generally applicable definition [of fair use] is possible, and
each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts") (citation omit-
ted); see also Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 740 (2d Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing "[t]he fair use test remains a totality inquiry, tailored to the particular facts of
each case"); RicHARD RAYSMAN, ET. AL. MULTIMEDIA LAw: Foms & ANALmsS § 5.08
(explaining fair use is fact specific and requires case by case determination).
148. See People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 1968) (holding statistics pro-
vided by prosecution were inadequate because they lacked statistical indepen-
dence). Therefore, courts see this kind of inference from statistical evidence as
less probative. See id.
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
150. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1016 (stating "[w]orks that are creative in na-
ture are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than are more fact
based works"). Sound recordings are creative in nature and go closer to intent of
copyright protection. See id.
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non-infringing demand would justify the particular file-sharing ser-
vice offered by Napster - - a centralized music file-sharing service
with multiple servers and all its special features .... It is quite likely
that such software would have been created even if only for non-
infringing purposes, even if the overall Napster service owns its exis-
tence to infringement."15 1
No evidence on the public's interest in Napster was presented
to the district court; the court, however, considered Napster's im-
pact on the market for on-line digital music services and its effect
on the demand for compact disks ("CDs").152 The court found that
Napster is likely to reduce CD sales of a key demographic group,
namely college students. 153
The district court also found that Napster allowed college stu-
dents to make a better CD purchase. 15 4 The court stated that stu-
dents are more likely to download "free" music by using Napster
than purchasing the CD. 155 This likelihood, however, does not nec-
essarily militate against a finding of fair use. If students bought
fewer CDs after deciding they did not value the songs from those
CDs, for example, then this action may constitute a fair use. This
scenario resembles the business strategy of placing music listening
stations in record stores, which the Copyright Act exempts as a non-
infringing activity. 156
There may be further support for a causal connection that a
drop in CD sales is caused by music consumers having convenient
access to preview music before a purchase and determining that the
151. Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and
other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 959 (2001).
152. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 909 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding Napster will reduce CD purchases
by college students).
153. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Plaintiff produced an expert
who produced surveys showing that forty-one percent of the college student re-
spondents stated that they used Napster to displace their regular CD sales. See
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 909. The expert further looked at the retail stores
near college campuses and found that online file sharing like the Napster technol-
ogy resulted in a loss of album sales in college markets. See id. at 909-10.
154. See Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 909 (stating "twenty-one percent of the
college students surveyed revealed that Napster helped them make a better selec-
tion or decide what to buy").
155. See id. at 910 (holding students are more likely to use free Napster service
rather than purchase music either at pay-per-download site or at music store).
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(7) (1994) ("[P]erformance of a nondramatic musical
work by a vending establishment open to the public at large without.., admission
charge, where the sole purpose of the performance is to promote the retail sale of
copies or phonorecords of the work .... and the performance is not transmitted
beyond the place where the establishment is located and is within the immediate
areas where the sales is occurring [is not an infringing use].").
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actual CD is not worth the price. Many music consumers complain
that they are being "ripped off' by the record industry because
"they" package CDs having only one or two "good" songs with eight
or nine "bad" songs. One can argue that Napster provided a conve-
nient listening station similar to those in music stores that allow a
purchaser to preview the CD before they buy it; one that does not
require the purchaser to stand around in a store for long periods of
time wearing headphones glazed with the ear wax of hundreds of
preceding patrons. Of course, if students bought fewer CDs be-
cause they downloaded music that they otherwise would have
bought, this use would not constitute a fair use. The district court,
however, merely indicated that Napster had an adverse effect on
the CD purchases near some universities. 157 The exact role that
Napster played in affecting the market was at best ambiguous based
on the district court's findings. 158 Absent an affirmative finding
that Napster users found Napster to be a market substitute for mu-
sic purchases, the value of this sort of evidence is questionable.
The absence of a direct infringer or evidence of a representa-
tive class of direct infringing users, before the court, resulted in a
significant factual void. Professor Nimmer stated the better para-
digm by recognizing that "it is permissible for a plaintiff to name as
a defendant solely a contributory infringer or one who is vicariously
liable, such as in circumstances where the direct infringer is not
subject to service of process or is unknown." 59 In Napster there was
a surfeit of potential direct infringer-defendants.
Conceptually, the need for the direct infringer is akin to, but
not identical to, the justification for standing or the requirement
for a case or controversy. As Justice Brennan has observed, "[hav-
ing the parties with] such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy [assures] that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions [is present.]"160
Clearly, Napster and the plaintiffs were adverse to each other, but,
the Napster ruling potentially could have an even greater impact on
the sixty-five million Napster users who represent the third party
beneficiaries of copyright law and the future development of peer-
157. See supra note 126.
158. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
159. NIMMER, supra note 55, at § 12.04 [A] [3] [a], at 12-82 (citations omitted).
160. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating "this is the gist of the
question of standing"). Since the decision in Napster labeled 65 million users as
direct infringers, it is theoretically possible that the case created 65 million joint
and severally liable defendants. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1004.
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to-peer technology. These parties, however, were not properly rep-
resented before the court.
The absence of third party beneficiaries in a direct infringe-
ment action is not a novel approach. Prior litigation against major
contributory infringers suggests this model. For example, Sony con-
cerned a direct infringer and evidence of how other Betamax users
(although not named defendants) actually used the machine. 61
The model applied by the parties and the court in American Geophys-
ical Union v. Texaco, Inc.162 is also instructive.1 63 The parties and the
court agreed that the issue of fair use should be decided through
the files of arbitrarily selected research scientists employed by the
defendant.164 A random or arbitrary group of direct infringers rep-
resented a better model of Napster's user base. Because the direct
infringers could have been the defendants and the plaintiffs could
have agreed not to seek damages from them (because there is joint
and several liability), Napster could have impeded a sample of di-
rect infringers to develop a complete record.1 65 The parties could
have also agreed on a representative group of direct infringers
whose putative infringing acts would have become part of the re-
cord and would have been analyzed as representative of the
whole. 166 Absent specific evidence of some alleged specific direct in-
fringing activities, and without hearing the "voices" of the alleged
direct infringers, however, the court was left to apply concrete con-
cepts of law requiring a factual, case-by-case analysis in the abstract.
The court, therefore, was unable to properly weigh the broader
public policy factors of the Napster case.
This analysis recommends what a court should require as a bare
minimum. Some commentators have taken a stronger stand urging
161. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studio Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423-24 (1984)
(stating parties conducted surveys as to how Betamax machines were used by own-
ers during specified time period).
-162. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
163. See id. Geophysical Union is not a case based on theories of secondary
liability. See id.
164. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 5 (stating
because of "convenience and to avoid untoward discovery expenses with respect to
largely duplicative matters, the stipulation provides that the trial of the issue of fair
use be conducted with respect to eight photocopies found in the files of an arbi-
trarily selected one of Texaco's several hundred scientific researchers"). See also
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d 913 (affirming district court's analysis).
165. See Little Mole Music v. Spike Invest. Inc., 720 F. Supp. 751, 755-56 (W.D.
Mo. 1989) (holding copyright infringement can result in joint and several liability
for all those directly or vicariously involved).
166. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 437. "Plaintiffs have waived any claim for dam-
ages or costs against Griffiths for his activities alleged in the complaint. Plaintiffs
never expected Griffiths to be represented by counsel and he has not been." Id.
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that courts should not decide contributory infringement cases in-
volving a new technology unless there is a represented defendant to
fully develop the defendant's fair use arguments. 167 I agree that the
preferred approach would be to have a represented party before
the court in order to develop the record and to articulate the pub-
lic's interest in access and use of the challenged technology or
service.
V. NAPSTER AS THE CYBER-ENTREPRENEUR CASE STUDY
Future cyber-entrepreneurs need to consider intellectual prop-
erty rights of others in the design of their technology or business
models. A few years ago, it was sufficient to know that your product
directly infringed the intellectual property rights of others. Today,
however, this is no longer the case. Rather, post-Napster cyber-en-
trepreneurs must consider the possibility of secondary liability
under the possible theories of contributory or vicarious liability,
and accordingly program their legal defenses into the design of the
technologically possible legal defenses. It is not far fetched to see a
day when software architects and intellectual property lawyers inte-
grate their respective skills to design non-infringing technological
and business models.
The best defense to a contributory or vicarious liability claim is
that there is no direct infringement. Unfortunately, however, due
to the decentralized nature of most Internet technology, the variety
of uses and individual users and the fact specific nature of "fair
use," constructing technology to integrate this "no direct infringe-
ment" defense is a difficult goal. As discussed earlier, even if some
uses and users are exempt under the fair use provisions of the Cop-
yright Act, a court is likely to find direct infringement from the
sheer volume of files that are transferred on any commercially prac-
ticable network. 168
Napster raised the defense that it is capable of substantial non-
infringing uses. 169 This defense is potentially applicable to future
technologies. Future cyber-entrepreneurs should learn from Nap-
ster that mere functionality often equals more protection. If Nap-
ster had functioned more like a search engine and its software
167. See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Commentary, Reflections on the Betamax Deci-
sions, 22 IDEA 79 265, 266-67 (1982) (stating appellate court did not fully appreci-
ate fact that not one single home user was represented party in litigation).
168. See supra notes 142-43.
169. SeeNapster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd inpart, rev'd
in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating Napster raised affirmative defense
that it is capable of substantial non-infringing uses).
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permitted users to exchange any file format the "capable of a sub-
stantial non-infringing use" argument would be much stronger.
The problem with the MP3 format is that it is embodied largely
commercial copyrighted music. Napster teaches potential innova-
tors that it is dangerous to ignore a cease and desist letter from
copyright owners. Once the cyber-entrepreneur is on notice of an
actual infringing activity, the defense that his service is "capable of
substantial non-infringing use" is no longer sufficient to a contribu-
tory liability claim and may entail a redesign of the technology or
business model in order to protect the interests of the copyright
owner.170
As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, the "capable of substantial
non-infringing use" defense is only a defense to contributory in-
fringement. 171 If the technology and business model results in
"control over" and "direct financial benefit" from the alleged in-
fringing use, the cyber-entrepreneur may find that the enterprise is
liable under theories of vicarious infringement. 72 Accordingly,
technologies and business models based on providing on-going ser-
vices (i.e., subscription services) or based on community building
models (i.e., Napster) are inherently problematic if the technology
or business model permits the cyber-entrepreneur to control ac-
cess, users or use. Two options that potentially work are totalitarian
control or total anarchy. 173 The cyber-entrepreneur may design se-
cure networks that only transmit an authorized file type so that the
network will permit only authorized non-infringing uses or create a
technology and business model that does not permit the enterprise
to exercise any control over its use or users.
Some business models are more problematic however; for ex-
ample, a subscription service providing for on-going services com-
pared to a one-time licensing of technology. Most service business
models will have inherently sufficient control for a court that is fol-
170. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1021 (stating once computer operator learns of
specific infringing material on his system and fails to purge such material, operator
knows of and contributes to direct copyright infringement regardless of whether
system is capable of substantial non-infringing uses).
171. See id. (holding absent specific information which identifies infringing
activities, computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringe-
ment merely because structure of system allows for exchange of copyrighted
material).
172. See id. at 1023 (stating Napster has financial benefit from users and right
and ability to control its users, therefore engaging in vicarious copyright
infringement).
173. Total control or total anarchy is most easily achieved by selling or licens-
ing a free standing product capable of substantial non-infringing uses without pro-
viding any direct support services; this is the classic case of Sony and Betamax.
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lowing the Napster precedent to find control, even if it is never exer-
cised, and in practical terms its exercise may be futile. For
example, Napster had the right to terminate repeat infringing
users, but those users could then immediately create new accounts
and continue with their illegal activities. After Napster, courts may
find a "financial benefit" in any business model or technology that
aggregates a large group of users. This aggregation will frequently
be incidental to any successful technology. As a result, it is unlikely
that a cyber-entrepreneur could eliminate the direct financial bene-
fit element from a successful business model or technology.
The cyber-entrepreneur should consider which of the narrowly
defined safe harbor provisions of the DMCA might apply to the busi-
ness model or technology and comply with the procedures estab-
lished by section 512.174 But, section 512 only precludes mandatory
damages. The cyber-entrepreneur may still be put out of business
by the court through a restraining order or other format injunctive
relief. Section 512 provisions require that the business adopt, im-
plement, and notify users of a policy that terminates the accounts of
repeat infringers. The provisions also require the business to ac-
commodate industry wide "standard technical measures," as well as
designate a copyright agent to receive notices of alleged infringe-
ment.175 Furthermore, the business met the copyright office of the
designated agent and placed notice of the designated agent on the
web page. 176 Finally, upon notification, the business must remove
or disable access, either know or should know of the alleged in-
fringing activity and shall not receive a direct financial benefit. 177
174. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (1999) ("[S]ervice providers shall not be liable...
if transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other
than the service provider, the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or
storage is carried through an automatic technical process without selection of the
material by the provider, the service provider does not select the recipients of the
material except as an automatic response to the request of another person, no
copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such intermedi-
ate or transient storage is maintained on the system of network in a manner ordi-
narily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is
maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such
anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission, routing, or provision or connections and the material is transmitted
through the system or network without modification of its content.").
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2) (stating limitations on liability will only apply if
service provider has designated agent to receive notifications of claimed copyright
infringement).
176. See § 512(C) (2) (A) (stating service provider must include name, address,
phone number and electronic mail address of notification agent on service pro-
vider's website).
177. See § 512(C) (1) (stating service providers will not be liable if it does not
have actual knowledge that material is infringing, that it should not know of appar-
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Accordingly, the cyber-entrepreneur must consider section 512 in
the design and implementation of the business and technology
model and not seek a section 512 safe harbor as an afterthought. 178
In summation, a prudent cyber-entrepreneur must establish a
business and technology model so that the cyber-entrepreneur ei-
ther knows or should know of potentially infringing activities. Fur-
ther, the cyber-entrepreneur should advertise and focus on legal
legitimate uses, not collect information on its use, create a technol-
ogy that is susceptible to numerous legitimate uses, insure that its
revenue stream is not tied directly or indirectly to infringing activi-
ties, aggregate functions and contract rights. The temptation is to
be a one-stop shop. The more functions that entrepreneurs pro-
vide, however, the more likely the courts will find infringement and
the broader the injunction they may issue. 179
VI. CONCLUSION
Two major lessons may be drawn from Napster. First, direct in-
fringers are necessary in order to create a complete record of how a
new technology is used so that the court may properly apply the fair
use factors. Second, system architecture, technologies, business
models and sound legal advice must be combined at the very start
of any new technology venture, if that venture is to avoid failing in
the courts despite being successful in the market. In essence, fu-
ture cyber-entrepreneurs must be proactive; and they must synergis-
tically consider their technology, business model and legal
strategies as the enterprise moves from theoretical construct to
reality.
As a final observation, the world will little note nor long mourn
the passing of Napster. As Napster died, 80 it merely yielded space
for newer and better technologies of competitors more capable of
meeting the current needs of file-swappers. Napster's sixty-five mil-
lion users have now found other, better opportunities. 181
ent infringing activity, that it remove such material or activities immediately upon
finding out that it is infringing, that it does not receive financial benefit and that it
acts immediately upon being notified that it is infringing).
178. See id. Section 1012 prohibits, with limited exceptions, technology that
circumvents digital rights management systems. See 17 U.S.C. § 1012 (1999).
179. Hypothetically, if Sony sold VTRs, blank VTR cassettes, ran a movie
rental store, and rented second VTRs to customers, it may have turned out quite
differently. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417-18
(1984).
180. Napster "died" in its incarnation as a free service and under its old busi-
ness model in response to the court's injunction.
181. See supra note 12 (listing potential Napster competitors).
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